

**TEXTES SÉANCE 3:**

(1) In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition which is not connected with an *ought* or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and, at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, 3.1.2., 1740.

(2) It is often said that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. [...] I shall attempt to demonstrate a counterexample to this thesis. [...] Consider the following series of statements:

- (1) Jones uttered the words “I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars”.
- (2) Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
- (3) Jones placed himself under the obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
- (4) Jones is under the obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
- (5) Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.

I shall argue concerning this list that the relation between any statement and its successor, while not in every case one of “entailment”, is nonetheless not just a contingent relation; and the additional statements necessary to make the relationship one of entailment do not need to involve any evaluative statements, moral principles, or anything of the sort.

John Searle, «How to derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’ », 1964

(3) Unless a sufficient number of people were prepared to assent to the moral principles which are the constitutive rules of the institution of promising, the word “promise” could not have a use. To take the extreme case: suppose that nobody thought that one ought to keep promises. It would then be impossible to make a promise; the word “promise” would become a mere noise (...).

Richard Mervin Hare, «The Promising Game», 1964

**1/ Traduction :**

- Etablir un lexique anglais-français comprenant les termes les plus difficiles, puis traduire soigneusement les trois textes en français.

**2/ Questions :**

- Expliquez comment John Searle tente de réfuter la thèse dite « humienne » selon laquelle il existerait une coupure radicale entre l’être (*is*) et le devoir-être (*ought*). En quoi la remarque de Richard Hare sur l’institution de la promesse remet-elle en question la tentative de réfutation de Searle ?