It seems a proposition, which will not admit of much dispute, that all our ideas are nothing
but copies of our impressions, or, in other words, that it is impossible for us to think of any
thing, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses. I have
endeavoured to explain and prove this proposition, and have expressed my hopes, that, by a
proper application of it, men may reach a greater clearness and precision in philosophical
reasonings, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may, perhaps,
be well known by definition, which is nothing but an enumeration of those parts or simple
ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed up definitions to the most simple ideas,
and find still some ambiguity and obscurity; what resource are we then possessed of? By
what invention can we throw light upon these ideas, and render them altogether precise and
determinate to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions or original sentiments, from
which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of
ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their
correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a
new microscope or species of optics, by which, in the moral sciences, the most minute, and
most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be
equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be the object of our
enquiry.

To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connexion, let us
examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us
search for it in all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived.

When we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we
are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any
quality, which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of
the other. We only find, that the one does actually, in fact, follow the other. The impulse of
one billiard-ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the
outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of
objects: Consequently, there is not, in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, any
thing which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.

From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from
it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind, we could foresee the
effect, even without experience; and might, at first, pronounce with certainty concerning it,
by the mere dint of thought and reasoning.

In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any
power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be
followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension,
motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event
which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one
object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force, which actuates
the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the
sensible qualities of body. We know, that, in fact, heat is a constant attendant of flame; but
what is the connexion between them, we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine.
It is impossible, therefore, that the idea of power can be derived from the contemplation of
bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power,
which can be the original of this idea.

David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (VII.1, Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, § 4-8)
When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object, which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment, where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, Cause; the other, Effect. We suppose, that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur, of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe, that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression, from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard-balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion, which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

David HUME, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (VII.2, Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion, § 27 et 28)