reached completion or is near enough to completion for its logical architecture to be apparent. We, wise after the event, may say in retrospect 'Those litigating theorists ought to have seen that some of the propositions which they were championing and contesting belonged not to competing stories of the same general pattern but to non-competing stories of highly disparate patterns'. But how could they have seen this? Unlike playing-cards, problems and solutions of problems do not have their suits and their denominations printed on their faces. Only late in the game can the thinker know even what have been trumps.

Certainly there are some domains of thought between which inadvertent trespassing could not easily occur. The problems of the High Court Judge or the cryptographer are so well demarcated off from those of the chemist or the navigator that we should laugh at anyone who seriously pretended to settle juridical issues by electrolysis or to solve ciphers by radiolocation, as we do not laugh, straight off, at the programmes of 'evolutionary ethics' or 'psycho-analytic theology'. But even though we know quite well that radiolocation methods could not be applied to the cryptographer's problems, since his are not that sort of question, still we have no short or easy way of classifying into contrasted sorts the questions of cryptography and those of navigation. Cryptographers have questions not just of one kind but of multifarious kinds. So have navigators. Yet all or most cryptographic questions differ from all or most navigational questions so widely, not only in subject-matter but also in logical style, that we should have no reason for surprise if we found that a man, equally well trained in both disciplines, proved to be able to think powerfully and swiftly in the one field but only slowly and inefficiently in the other. A good High Court Judge might, in the same way, be an inferior thinker in matters of poker, algebra, finance or aerodynamics, however well coached he might be in its terminology and its techniques. The questions which belong to different domains of thought, differ very often not only in the kinds of subject-matter that they are about, but in the kinds of thinking that they require. So the segregation of questions into their kinds demands some very delicate discriminations of some very unpalpable features.

Part of the general point which I am trying to express is some-
times put by saying that the terms or concepts entering into the questions, statements and arguments of, say, the High Court Judge are of different 'categories' from those under which fall the terms or concepts of the chemist, the financier or the chess-player. So competing answers to the same question, though given in different terms, would still be in cognate terms of the same category or set of categories, whereas there could be no competition between answers to different questions, since the terms in which these very questions were posed would themselves be of alien categories. This idiom can be helpful as a familiar mnemonic with some beneficial associations. It can also be an impediment, if credited with the virtues of a skeleton-key.

I think it is worth while to take some pains with this word 'category', but not for the usual reason, namely that there exists an exact, professional way of using it, in which, like a skeleton-key, it will turn all our locks for us; but rather for the unusual reason that there is an inexact, amateurish way of using it in which, like a coal-hammer, it will make a satisfactory knocking noise on doors which we want opened to us. It gives the answers to none of our questions but it can be made to arouse people to the questions in a properly brusque way.

Aristotle for some excellent purposes of his own worked out an inventory of some ten heads of elementary questions that can be asked about an individual thing or person. We can ask of what sort it is, what it is like, how tall, wide or heavy it is, where it is, what are its dates, what it is doing, what is being done to it, in what condition it is and one or two others. To each such question there corresponds a range of possible answering-terms, one of which will, in general, be true and the rest false of the individual concerned. The terms satisfying one such interrogative will not be answers, true or false, to any of the other interrogatives. '158 pounds' does not inform you or misinform you about what Socrates is doing, where he is or what sort of a creature he is. Terms satisfying the same interrogative are then said to be of the same category; terms satisfying different interrogatives are of different categories.

Now, aside from the fact that Aristotle's inventory of possible interrogatives about an individual may contain redundancies and certainly is capable of indefinite expansion, we have to notice the