VII

But now, provoked largely by the frequent and unexamined occurrences of ‘real’, ‘really’, ‘real shape’, &c., in the arguments we have just been considering, I want to take a closer look at this little word ‘real’. I propose, if you like, to discuss the Nature of Reality—a genuinely important topic, though in general I don’t much like making this claim.

There are two things, first of all, which it is immensely important to understand here.

1. ‘Real’ is an absolutely normal word, with nothing new-fangled or technical or highly specialized about it. It is, that is to say, already firmly established in, and very frequently used in, the ordinary language we all use every day. Thus in this sense it is a word which has a fixed meaning, and so can’t, any more than can any other word which is firmly established, be fooled around with ad lib. Philosophers often seem to think that they can just ‘assign’ any meaning whatever to any word; and so no doubt, in an absolutely trivial sense, they can (like Humpty-Dumpty). There are some expressions, of course, ‘material thing’ for example, which only philosophers use, and in such cases they can, within reason, please themselves; but most words are in fact used in a
particular way already, and this fact can’t be just disregarded. (For example, some meanings that have been assigned to ‘know’ and ‘certain’ have made it seem outrageous that we should use these terms as we actually do; but what this shows is that the meanings assigned by some philosophers are wrong.) Certainly, when we have discovered how a word is in fact used, that may not be the end of the matter; there is certainly no reason why, in general, things should be left exactly as we find them; we may wish to tidy the situation up a bit, revise the map here and there, draw the boundaries and distinctions rather differently. But still, it is advisable always to bear in mind (a) that the distinctions embodied in our vast and, for the most part, relatively ancient stock of ordinary words are neither few nor always very obvious, and almost never just arbitrary; (b) that in any case, before indulging in any tampering on our own account, we need to find out what it is that we have to deal with; and (c) that tampering with words in what we take to be one little corner of the field is always liable to have unforeseen repercussions in the adjoining territory. Tampering, in fact, is not so easy as is often supposed, is not justified or needed so often as is often supposed, and is often thought to be necessary just because what we’ve got already has been misrepresented. And we must always be particularly wary of the philosophical habit of dismissing some (if not all) the ordinary uses of a word as ‘unimportant’, a habit which makes distortion practically unavoidable. For instance, if we are going to talk about ‘real’, we must
not dismiss as beneath contempt such humble but familiar expressions as 'not real cream'; this may save us from saying, for example, or seeming to say that what is not real cream must be a fleeting product of our cerebral processes.

2. The other immensely important point to grasp is that 'real' is not a normal word at all, but highly exceptional; exceptional in this respect that, unlike 'yellow' or 'horse' or 'walk', it does not have one single, specifiable, always-the-same meaning. (Even Aristotle saw through this idea.) Nor does it have a large number of different meanings—it is not ambiguous, even 'systematically'. Now words of this sort have been responsible for a great deal of perplexity. Consider the expressions 'cricket ball', 'cricket bat', 'cricket pavilion', 'cricket weather'. If someone did not know about cricket and were obsessed with the use of such 'normal' words as 'yellow', he might gaze at the ball, the bat, the building, the weather, trying to detect the 'common quality' which (he assumes) is attributed to these things by the prefix 'cricket'. But no such quality meets his eye; and so perhaps he concludes that 'cricket' must designate a non-natural quality, a quality to be detected not in any ordinary way but by intuition. If this story strikes you as too absurd, remember what philosophers have said about the word 'good'; and reflect that many philosophers, failing to detect any ordinary quality common to real ducks, real cream, and real progress, have decided that Reality must be an a priori concept apprehended by reason alone.
Let us begin, then, with a preliminary, no doubt rather haphazard, survey of some of the complexities in the use of ‘real’. Consider, for instance, a case which at first sight one might think was pretty straightforward—the case of ‘real colour’. What is meant by the ‘real’ colour of a thing? Well, one may say with some confidence, that’s easy enough: the real colour of the thing is the colour that it looks to a normal observer in conditions of normal or standard illumination; and to find out what a thing’s real colour is, we just need to be normal and to observe it in those conditions.

But suppose (a) that I remark to you of a third party, ‘That isn’t the real colour of her hair.’ Do I mean by this that, if you were to observe her in conditions of standard illumination, you would find that her hair did not look that colour? Plainly not—the conditions of illumination may be standard already. I mean, of course, that her hair has been dyed, and normal illumination just doesn’t come into it at all. Or suppose that you are looking at a ball of wool in a shop, and I say, ‘That’s not its real colour.’ Here I may mean that it won’t look that colour in ordinary daylight; but I may mean that wool isn’t that colour before it’s dyed. As so often, you can’t tell what I mean just from the words that I use; it makes a difference, for instance, whether the thing under discussion is or is not of a type which is customarily dyed.

Suppose (b) that there is a species of fish which looks vividly multi-coloured, slightly glowing perhaps, at a depth of a thousand feet. I ask you what its real colour is.
Sense and Sensibilia

So you catch a specimen and lay it out on deck, making sure the condition of the light is just about normal, and you find that it looks a muddy sort of greyish white. Well, is that its real colour? It’s clear enough at any rate that we don’t have to say so. In fact, is there any right answer in such a case?

Compare: ‘What is the real taste of saccharine?’ We dissolve a tablet in a cup of tea and we find that it makes the tea taste sweet; we then take a tablet neat, and we find that it tastes bitter. Is it really bitter, or really sweet?

(c) What is the real colour of the sky? Of the sun? Of the moon? Of a chameleon? We say that the sun in the evening sometimes looks red—well, what colour is it really? (What are the ‘conditions of standard illumination’ for the sun?)

(d) Consider a pointilliste painting of a meadow, say; if the general effect is of green, the painting may be composed of predominantly blue and yellow dots. What is the real colour of the painting?

(e) What is the real colour of an after-image? The trouble with this one is that we have no idea what an alternative to its ‘real colour’ might be. Its apparent colour, the colour that it looks, the colour that it appears to be?—but these phrases have no application here. (You might ask me, ‘What colour is it really?’ if you suspected that I had lied in telling you its colour. But ‘What colour is it really?’ is not quite the same as ‘What is its real colour?’)

Or consider ‘real shape’ for a moment. This notion cropped up, you may remember, seeming quite unprob-
lematic, when we were considering the coin which was said to 'look elliptical' from some points of view; it had a real shape, we insisted, which remained unchanged. But coins in fact are rather special cases. For one thing their outlines are well defined and very highly stable, and for another they have a known and a nameable shape. But there are plenty of things of which this is not true. What is the real shape of a cloud? And if it be objected, as I dare say it could be, that a cloud is not a 'material thing' and so not the kind of thing which has to have a real shape, consider this case: what is the real shape of a cat? Does its real shape change whenever it moves? If not, in what posture is its real shape on display? Furthermore, is its real shape such as to be fairly smooth-outlined, or must it be finely enough serrated to take account of each hair? It is pretty obvious that there is no answer to these questions—no rules according to which, no procedure by which, answers are to be determined. Of course, there are plenty of shapes which the cat definitely is not—cylindrical, for instance. But only a desperate man would toy with the idea of ascertaining the cat's real shape 'by elimination'.

Contrast this with cases in which we do know how to proceed: 'Are those real diamonds?', 'Is that a real duck?' Items of jewellery that more or less closely resemble diamonds may not be real diamonds because they are paste or glass; that may not be a real duck because it is a decoy, or a toy duck, or a species of goose closely resembling a duck, or because I am having a hallucination. These are all of course quite different cases. And notice in
particular (a) that, in most of them 'observation by a normal observer in standard conditions' is completely irrelevant; (b) that something which is not a real duck is not a *non-existent* duck, or indeed a non-existent anything; and (c) that something existent, e.g. a toy, may perfectly well not be real, e.g. not a real duck.¹

Perhaps by now we have said enough to establish that there is more in the use of 'real' than meets the cursory eye; it has many and diverse uses in many diverse contexts. We must next, then, try to tidy things up a little; and I shall now mention under four headings what might be called the salient features of the use of 'real'—though not *all* these features are equally conspicuous in all its uses.

1. First, 'real' is a word that we may call *substantive-hungry*. Consider:

   'These diamonds are real';
   'These are real diamonds'.

This pair of sentences looks like, in an obvious grammatical respect, this other pair:

   'These diamonds are pink';
   'These are pink diamonds'.

¹ 'Exist', of course, is itself extremely tricky. The word is a verb, but it does not describe something that things do all the time, like breathing, only quieter—ticking over, as it were, in a metaphysical sort of way. It is only too easy to start wondering what, then, existing *is*. The Greeks were worse off than we are in this region of discourse—for our different expressions 'to be', 'to exist', and 'real' they made do with the single word *ēiva*. We have not their excuse for getting confused on this admittedly confusing topic.
But whereas we can just say of something ‘This is pink’, we can’t just say of something ‘This is real’. And it is not very difficult to see why. We can perfectly well say of something that it is pink without knowing, without any reference to, what it is. But not so with ‘real’. For one and the same object may be both a real \( x \) and not a real \( y \); an object looking rather like a duck may be a real decoy duck (not just a toy) but not a real duck. When it isn’t a real duck but a hallucination, it may still be a real hallucination—as opposed, for instance, to a passing quirk of a vivid imagination. That is, we must have an answer to the question ‘A real what?’, if the question ‘Real or not?’ is to have a definite sense, to get any foothold. And perhaps we should also mention here another point—that the question ‘Real or not?’ does not always come up, can’t always be raised. We do raise this question only when, to speak rather roughly, suspicion assails us—in some way or other things may be not what they seem; and we can raise this question only if there is a way, or ways, in which things may be not what they seem. What alternative is there to being a ‘real’ after-image?

‘Real’ is not, of course, the only word we have that is substantive-hungry. Other examples, perhaps better known ones, are ‘the same’ and ‘one’. The same team may not be the same collection of players; a body of troops may be one company and also three platoons. Then what about ‘good’? We have here a variety of gaps crying out for substantives—‘A good what?’, ‘Good at what?’—a good
book, perhaps, but not a good novel; good at pruning
roses, but not good at mending cars. 1

2. Next, ‘real’ is what we may call a trouser-word. It is
usually thought, and I dare say usually rightly thought,
that what one might call the affirmative use of a term is
basic—that, to understand ‘x’, we need to know what it is
to be x, or to be an x, and that knowing this apprises us of
what it is not to be x, not to be an x. But with ‘real’ (as we
briefly noted earlier) it is the negative use that wears the
trousers. That is, a definite sense attaches to the assertion
that something is real, a real such-and-such, only in the
light of a specific way in which it might be, or might have
been, not real. ‘A real duck’ differs from the simple ‘a
duck’ only in that it is used to exclude various ways of
being not a real duck—but a dummy, a toy, a picture, a
decoy, &c.; and moreover I don’t know just how to take
the assertion that it’s a real duck unless I know just what,
on that particular occasion, the speaker has it in mind to
exclude. This, of course, is why the attempt to find a
characteristic common to all things that are or could be
called ‘real’ is doomed to failure; the function of ‘real’
is not to contribute positively to the characterization
of anything, but to exclude possible ways of being
not real—and these ways are both numerous for
particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite differ-
ent for things of different kinds. It is this identity of

1 In Greek the case of σοφός is of some importance; Aristotle seems to
get into difficulties by trying to use σοφία ‘absolutely’, so to speak, with-
out specification of the field in which σοφία is exercised and shown. Com-
pare on δεινότης too.
general function combined with immense diversity in specific applications which gives to the word 'real' the, at first sight, baffling feature of having neither one single 'meaning', nor yet ambiguity, a number of different meanings.

3. Thirdly, 'real' is (like 'good') a dimension-word. I mean by this that it is the most general and comprehensive term in a whole group of terms of the same kind, terms that fulfil the same function. Other members of this group, on the affirmative side, are, for example, 'proper', 'genuine', 'live', 'true', 'authentic', 'natural'; and on the negative side, 'artificial', 'fake', 'false', 'bogus', 'makeshift', 'dummy', 'synthetic', 'toy'—and such nouns as 'dream', 'illusion', 'mirage', 'hallucination' belong here as well.¹ It is worth noticing here that, naturally enough, the less general terms on the affirmative side have the merit, in many cases, of suggesting more or less definitely what it is that is being excluded; they tend to pair off, that is, with particular terms on the negative side and thus, so to speak, to narrow the range of possibilities. If I say that I wish the university had a proper theatre, this suggests that it has at present a makeshift theatre; pictures are genuine as opposed to fake, silk is natural as opposed to artificial, ammunition is live as opposed to dummy, and so on. In practice, of course, we often get a clue to what it is that is in question from the substantive

¹ Of course, not all the uses of all these words are of the kind we are here considering—though it would be wise not to assume, either, that any of their uses are completely different, completely unconnected.
in the case, since we frequently have a well-founded antecedent idea in what respects the kind of thing mentioned could (and could not) be 'not real'. For instance, if you ask me 'Is this real silk?' I shall tend to supply 'as opposed to artificial', since I already know that silk is the kind of thing which can be very closely simulated by an artificial product. The notion of its being toy silk, for instance, will not occur to me.¹

A large number of questions arises here—which I shall not go into—concerning both the composition of these families of 'reality'-words and 'unreality'-words, and also the distinctions to be drawn between their individual members. Why, for instance, is being a proper carving-knife one way of being a real carving-knife, whereas being pure cream seems not to be one way of being real cream? Or to put it differently: how does the distinction between real cream and synthetic cream differ from the distinction between pure cream and adulterated cream? Is it just that adulterated cream still is, after all, cream? And why are false teeth called 'false' rather than, say, 'artificial'? Why are artificial limbs so-called, in preference to 'false'? Is it that false teeth, besides doing much the same job as real teeth, look, and are meant to look, deceptively like real teeth? Whereas an artificial limb, perhaps, is meant to do

¹ Why not? Because silk can't be 'toy'. Yes, but why not? Is it that a toy is, strictly speaking, something quite small, and specially made or designed to be manipulated in play? The water in toy beer-bottles is not toy beer, but pretend beer. Could a toy watch actually have clockwork inside and show the time correctly? Or would that be just a miniature watch?
the same job, but is neither intended, nor likely, to be passed off as a real limb.

Another philosophically notorious dimension-word, which has already been mentioned in another connexion as closely comparable with ‘real’, is ‘good’. ‘Good’ is the most general of a very large and diverse list of more specific words, which share with it the general function of expressing commendation, but differ among themselves in their aptness to, and implications in, particular contexts. It is a curious point, of which Idealist philosophers used to make much at one time, that ‘real’ itself, in certain uses, may belong to this family. ‘Now this is a real carving-knife!’ may be one way of saying that this is a good carving-knife.1 And it is sometimes said of a bad poem, for instance, that it isn’t really a poem at all; a certain standard must be reached, as it were, even to qualify.

4. Lastly, ‘real’ also belongs to a large and important family of words that we may call adjuster-words—words, that is, by the use of which other words are adjusted to meet the innumerable and unforeseeable demands of the world upon language. The position, considerably oversimplified no doubt, is that at a given time our language contains words that enable us (more or less) to say what we want to say in most situations that (we think) are liable to turn up. But vocabularies are finite; and the variety of possible situations that may confront us is

1 Colloquially at least, the converse is also found: ‘I gave him a good hiding’—‘a real hiding’—‘a proper hiding’.
neither finite nor precisely foreseeable. So situations are practically bound to crop up sometimes with which our vocabulary is not already fitted to cope in any tidy, straightforward style. We have the word ‘pig’, for instance, and a pretty clear idea which animals, among those that we fairly commonly encounter, are and are not to be so called. But one day we come across a new kind of animal, which looks and behaves very much as pigs do, but not quite as pigs do; it is somehow different. Well, we might just keep silent, not knowing what to say; we don’t want to say positively that it is a pig, or that it is not. Or we might, if for instance we expected to want to refer to these new creatures pretty often, invent a quite new word for them. But what we could do, and probably would do first of all, is to say, ‘It’s like a pig.’ (‘Like’ is the great adjuster-word, or, alternatively put, the main flexibility-device by whose aid, in spite of the limited scope of our vocabulary, we can always avoid being left completely speechless.) And then, having said of this animal that it’s like a pig, we may proceed with the remark, ‘But it isn’t a real pig’—or more specifically, and using a term that naturalists favour, ‘not a true pig’. If we think of words as being shot like arrows at the world, the function of these adjuster-words is to free us from the disability of being able to shoot only straight ahead; by their use on occasion, such words as ‘pig’ can be, so to speak, brought into connexion with targets lying slightly off the simple, straightforward line on which they are ordinarily aimed. And in this way we gain, besides
flexibility, precision; for if I can say, 'Not a real pig, but like a pig', I don’t have to tamper with the meaning of 'pig' itself.

But, one might ask, do we have to have 'like' to serve this purpose? We have, after all, other flexibility-devices. For instance, I might say that animals of this new species are 'piggish'; I might perhaps call them 'quasi-pigs', or describe them (in the style of vendors of peculiar wines) as 'pig-type' creatures. But these devices, excellent no doubt in their way, can’t be regarded as substitutes for 'like', for this reason: they equip us simply with new expressions on the same level as, functioning in the same way as, the word 'pig' itself; and thus, though they may perhaps help us out of our immediate difficulty, they themselves may land us in exactly the same kind of difficulty at any time. We have this kind of wine, not real port, but a tolerably close approximation to port, and we call it 'port type'. But then someone produces a new kind of wine, not port exactly, but also not quite the same as what we now call 'port type'. So what are we to say? Is it port-type type? It would be tedious to have to say so, and besides there would clearly be no future in it. But as it is we can say that it is like port-type wine (and for that matter rather like port, too); and in saying this we don’t saddle ourselves with a new word, whose application may itself prove problematic if the vintners spring yet another surprise on us. The word 'like' equips us generally to handle the unforeseen, in a way in which new words invented ad hoc don’t, and can’t.
(Why then do we need ‘real’ as an adjuster-word as well as ‘like’? Why exactly do we want to say, sometimes ‘It is like a pig’, sometimes ‘It is not a real pig’? To answer these questions properly would be to go a long way towards making really clear the use, the ‘meaning’, of ‘real’.)

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It should be quite clear, then, that there are no criteria to be laid down in general for distinguishing the real from the not real. How this is to be done must depend on what it is with respect to which the problem arises in particular cases. Furthermore, even for particular kinds of things, there may be many different ways in which the distinction may be made (there is not just one way of being ‘not a real pig’)—this depends on the number and variety of the surprises and dilemmas nature and our fellow men may spring on us, and on the surprises and dilemmas we have been faced with hitherto. And of course, if there is never any dilemma or surprise, the question simply doesn’t come up; if we had simply never had occasion to distinguish anything as being in any way like a pig but not a real pig, then the words ‘real pig’ themselves would have no application—as perhaps the words ‘real after-image’ have no application.

Again, the criteria we employ at a given time can’t be taken as final, not liable to change. Suppose that one day a creature of the kind we now call a cat takes to talking.

1 Incidentally, nothing is gained at all by saying that ‘real’ is a normative word and leaving it at that, for ‘normative’ itself is much too general and vague. Just how, in what way, is ‘real’ normative? Not, presumably, in just the same way as ‘good’ is. And it’s the differences that matter.
Well, we say to begin with, I suppose, ‘This cat can talk.’ But then other cats, not all, take to talking as well; we now have to say that some cats talk, we distinguish between talking and non-talking cats. But again we may, if talking becomes prevalent and the distinction between talking and not talking seems to us to be really important, come to insist that a *real* cat be a creature that can talk. And this will give us a new case of being ‘not a real cat’, i.e. being a creature just like a cat except for not talking.

Of course—this may seem perhaps hardly worth saying, but in philosophy it seems it does need to be said—we make a distinction between ‘a real x’ and ‘not a real x’ only if there is a way of telling the difference between what is a real x and what is not. A distinction which we are not in fact able to draw is—to put it politely—not worth making.